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CONTEXT
Primary health care reforms 2002
GP payments
• capitation paid to PHOs replaces fee-for-service paid to GPs
• capitation payments for GP and nurse services ‘passed 
through’ by PHOs to GPs under PHO-GP contracts
• GP right to charge patients directly is retained 
• albeit with the threat of regulatory intervention
Government contribution to primary care increased
• policy expectation that gradual capitation increases will be 
‘passed through’ to patients via lower ‘out-of-pocket’ fees
CONSEQUENCES
Fundamental change in
• the role of the government subsidy
• from treatment benefit to insurance premium
• financial risk-bearing 
• GPs become risk underwriters (‘insurers’)
Changes the entire business model for the sector
• different ‘rules of engagement’ necessary
• price-setting by GPs
• competitive interaction
• regulatory requirements
Changes in industry structure
• Ownership
• Workforce incentives, quality of human capital
ILLUSTRATED BY
Junior doctors’ strike, hospital waiting list cull
• GP demand increases due to factors entirely outside of GP 
control
Threatened price regulation by the Ministry of Health 
and DHBs
• exacerbates the effects of ‘uncontrollable’ financial risks faced 
by GPs as a consequence of capitation 
Increases in capitation subsidies compulsorily passed 
through as (regulated?) reductions in patient 
payments
• patient payments must rise even for patients not receiving the 
subsidy increases
SUBSIDISED HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS
FEE-FOR-SERVICE SYSTEM (PRE-NZPHCS)
CAPITATION SYSTEM (NZPHCS)
EXAMPLE I: WAITING LIST CULL
Consultation costs = $50
Patient payment = $20
Deficit for each additional consultation = $30
Patient charges rise for all patients to cover DHB 
policy costs (demand-shifting)
The more patients referred back to the GP, the 
greater the deficit
– all patients of ‘unlucky GPs’  with more individuals/sicker 
individuals on the waiting list pay more than those of ‘luckier’
GPs 
EXAMPLE II: DIFFERENT CAPITATION 
CLASSES
High-capitated 65+ year old  - $15 patient payment
Low-capitated 25-44 year-old - $48 patient payment
Deficit for 65+ patient referred = $35
Deficit for 25-44 patient referred = $2
The higher the proportion of higher-capitated
patients referred back, the higher the deficit, and 
the larger the increases in patient payments to 
recoup additional losses
High-capitated patients (elderly, young, chronically 
ill) disproportionately represented in waiting lists
• patient payment increases to meet DHB demand-shifting will 
not be trivial
ILLUSTRATION III: PATIENT LIST MIX
Access practice – average patient payment $20
Interim practice – average patient payment $35
Each have 20 patients referred back
Each provide the same number of consultations Q
Access deficit = 20 x $30 = $600 
• increase = $600/(Q+20) per consultation
Interim deficit = 20 x $15 = $300
• Increase = $300/(Q+20) per consultation
The Access practice price increase per consultation 
is twice that of the Interim practice
• ‘higher-need’ Access practice patients bear a 
disproportionately higher share of the costs of the DHB 
policy than ‘lower-need’ Interim practice patients
ILLUSTRATION IV: CAPITATION ROLLOUT 
TO ANOTHER GROUP
Assume 1000 patients initially unsubsidised.
All pay $50 (Group A patient payment)
On average, each makes 4 visits a year – 4000 
consults
GP costs = $50 X 4000 = $200,000
Half (Group B) now provided a ‘capitation subsidy 
of $100 per year
Pass-through means their co-payments are 
expected to be $25 per visit – regulator fixes 
Group B price at this level 
ILLUSTRATION IV: CAPITATION ROLLOUT 
TO ANOTHER GROUP (cont)
But Group B individuals now (with lower prices) 
make on average 5 visits per year – 4500 visits in 
total
GP costs now $50 x 4500 = $225,000
Group B patient payments $25 x 2500 = $62,500
Capitation income = $100 x 500 = $50,000
Group B total income = $112,500
Difference to recoup from Group A = $225,000 -
$112,500 = $112,500
Cost per Group A consultation = $112,500/2000 = 
$56.25
Pass-through obligations mean Group A prices rise, 
even though Group A receives no subsidy
WHY DO THESE ‘ANOMALIES’ OCCUR?
The allocation of financial responsibility for 
variations in demand for health care
Inadequate attention given to financial risk-bearing 
by NZPHCS policy-makers in system design
• ALL health systems are insurance systems (even 
Government-funded ones)
• the insurance element is necessary to manage the 
unpredictability of knowing who will need treatment and 
when (and therefore the ability to pay for treatment when it is 
needed) – Arrow (1963) – Nobel Laureate
• ‘population-based funding’ is simply a synonym for 
‘insurance’ (relates to population – Group A)  relative to 
‘funding for treatments’ (relates to benefit payments, relates 
to Group B)
IMPLICATIONS
The capitation payment is NOT a treatment subsidy
paid to ill individuals 
Rather, it is a premium subsidy paid in respect of 
well individuals
Regulating the patient payment as if it is only the 
‘top up’ to a treatment subsidy represented by a 
‘notional’, ‘averaged’ capitation payment ignores 
all of the random variations (‘risk differences’) 
that occur between practices, that will affect GP 
costs in a system where GPs are both risk 
managers and care deliverers
Capacity for DHBs to regulate insurance system?
THE NZPHCS ‘PROBLEMS’
Patient out-of-pocket payment must perform all the 
roles of
• premium top-up
• co-payment
• treatment benefit
• patient payment
but politicians/policy-makers/DHB contract 
managers treat it as if it is only a patient payment
Capitation ‘pass-throughs’ mean the single 
capitation payment is used as both
• a premium contribution 
• addressing a political social wealth distribution objective
• a supply-side cost sharing instrument
• altering treatment provider behaviour
INCREASING CAPITATION ROLLOUTS 
EXACERBATE THE PROBLEMS
Each rollout pushes more financial risk onto GPs
GPs are unable to manage this risk by clinical 
practice alone
Therefore will have to engage in ‘undesirable’ 
behaviour to manage additional financial risk
• higher patient charges
• active management of the patient list
• ‘cream-skimming’
• supply restriction
SUPPLY RESTRICTION
FOLLOW-ON IMPLICATION
The higher the proportion of a GP’s income derived 
from capitation
e.g. Access vs Interim; or as increases in capitation are ‘rolled 
out’ to new patient groups
the greater the financial risk to GP incomes (and by 
extension, the likelihood of variation in patient 
charges) from random events outside the GP’s 
control 
e.g. localised epidemics, random variations in the distribution of 
patient health states (e.g. a large, sick family moves into 
town) or policy/regulatory actions
CONSEQUENCES
Strong incentives for GPs to ‘cream-skim’
• ‘stack the books’ with ‘healthier-than-average’ patients
• not present in FFS system (as no demand variation risk borne)
• rewards to cream-skimming greater the higher the proportion 
of GP income derived from capitation
• conversely, costs from being ‘unlucky’ greater, the higher the 
proportion of GP income derived from capitation
System constructed to facilitate ‘cream-skimming’
• sets up high risk Access pools, then rewards cream-
skimming
• access to Interim patient shedding example
• equal risk-bearing equilibrium
LONG-RUN EFFECTS
No incentives for GPs to work hard
• implications for new GPs gaining experience
Self-selection
• hard-working GPs will pursue opportunities in markets that 
reward effort
• remaining GPs ‘less ambitious’/less hard-working?
• slower accumulation of human capital
• lower quality service relative to other markets
Implications for practice prices and ownership
• who will provide services in ‘uncommercial’ areas?
• an ‘employee’ culture?
A two-tier system as per tertiary provision?
LOOKING FORWARD
If persisting with a Managed Care model
• system must be regulated as a full, managed care insurance 
model
• requires detailed information about individual practice patient 
risk profiles 
• current information collection does not support this form of 
regulation
• even GPs/PHOs may not be collecting appropriate 
information to set prices optimally
Does NZ have the skills and/or willingness to go 
down this path?
